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Abstract 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization working for 
economic cooperation and stability. The IMF’s work is aimed at both temporary credit 
access and structural reforms to increase economic growth. In theory, the IMF can 
influence economic growth via several channels. This paper identifies four; provide money 
through loan disbursements, work as an insurance for investors, attach policy conditions to 
programs and monitor the world economy. The analysis consists of a panel of 86 
developing countries during the period of 1983-2010, employing both OLS and 2SLS to 
control for possible endogeneity in the estimations. Performing a regression analysis on the 
overall effect of IMF programs on economic growth, a significantly positive result is 
confirmed. This thesis then opens up to a new input by controlling for the effect on growth 
during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, for six different loan types and three large regions in 
the world. The results show a significantly positive effect on economic growth during the 
1980s and 2000s. Two lending arrangements have confirmed positive effects, the Stand-by 
arrangements (SBA) and Extended credit facility (ECF). Finally the IMF is successful in 
raising economic growth in Asia and South America. In summary, this thesis concludes 
that the IMF is successful in promoting growth.   
 
Key words: International Monetary Fund, economic growth, panel data, developing 
countries, macroeconomics   
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 Abbreviations  
Following abbreviations are presented in the order of their occurrence. 
 
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
OLS – Ordinary least squares 
2SLS – Two stage least squares  
SBA – Stand-by arrangements 
EFF – Extended fund facility 
FCL – Flexible credit line 
SAF – Structural adjustment facility 
ESF – Exogenous shock facility  
SDR – Special drawing rights 
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1. Introduction 
Economic crises are not a new phenomenon in the world economy and have appeared 
several times during the last century. The Great Depression of the 1930s is one of the most 
famous ones and it led to large welfare losses. As with wars, these kinds of tragedies often 
lead to countries coming together to collaborate. This was the case with the International 
Monetary Fund (the IMF), an international economic collaboration. The aims of the IMF’s 
work are set wide: “to foster international monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, 
facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, 
and reduce poverty around the world” (IMF 2013b).  
These goals are important but not easy to achieve. In particular, given the broad 
reach of the IMF’s work, it is important to understand its consequences on economic 
growth in terms of GDP per capita. Growth can be a goal in itself, as well as a measure to 
reach other targets. Increasing economic growth can be argued to be an especially 
important aim for the developing parts of the world. Notably, this made us think about the 
purpose of the organization and to pose the question: does the IMF promote growth?  
One of the primary tools of the IMF to promote economic growth is to provide 
lending arrangements to countries. These programs offer short-term relief to countries 
facing balance of payments problems
1
 or temporary crisis. Furthermore, they also offer 
structural support to countries whose macroeconomic policies prevent them from 
developing. With most programs certain policy conditions are attached and the loans are 
paid in instalments. This means that countries need to fulfil the predetermined policy 
reform criteria in order to get further instalments (Barro & Lee 2003, Prezworski & 
Vreeland 2000). The programs differ on the specific conditions, timing and amount of loan 
disbursements. However, the basic objectives of the loans are the same: to restore 
economic stability, since it is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth 
(Conway 1994, Fischer 1997). 
A range of research examines if, and how, the IMF can promote growth. A 
summarised selection of these is presented in Table 1, containing descriptions of the 
studies, their methods and results. As can be seen the effect is not straightforward. 
 
                                                 
1
 Balance of payment problems occurs when a country no longer is able to meet international payment 
obligations (IMF 2008). 
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Table 1 – Summary of earlier research  
 
 Positive Negative Sample and description of 
study 
Method Results 
Przeworski 
and Vreeland 
(2000) 
 x 135 countries, during 1951-
1990. Examine the effect of 
IMF programs on economic 
growth. 
Instrumental 
variable 
approach to 
control for 
selection 
bias.  
Growth is reduced 
during a program. After 
a program growth is 
faster, but not faster 
than it would have 
without a program. 
Barro and 
Lee (2003) 
 x 130 countries, during 1975-
2000. Examine factors which 
increase the likelihood of 
receiving a loan and direct 
and indirect effects of IMF 
programs. 
Instrumental 
variable 
approach, 
3SLS. 
IMF programs have 
significantly negative 
effects on growth. 
 
Dreher 
(2006)  
 x 98 developing countries, 
during 1970-2000. Examines 
effect of IMF programs on 
economic growth. 
 
Instrumental 
variable 
approach, 
SUR and 
3SLS.   
IMF programs reduce 
growth, but compliance 
with the conditions 
moderates the negative 
effect. 
Marchesi & 
Sirtori 
(2011) 
 x 128 developing countries, 
during 1982-2005. Examine 
the joint effect of the IMF and 
the World Bank programs on 
economic growth. 
OLS and 
2SLS. 
The organizations 
together have a positive 
effect on growth, while 
IMF alone has a 
negative effect. 
 
Killick et al. 
(1990) 
 x Studied 38 programs in 16 
developing countries, during 
1979-1985. Examine the 
lagged effects of IMF 
programs on growth. 
 Before-after 
approach. 
IMF programs have a 
significantly positive 
effect on growth after 3-
4 years. 
 
Reichmann 
& Stillson  
x  Studied 85 programs during 
1963-1972.  Examine the 
annual growth rate of GDP 
before and after the 
introduction of a program. 
Before-after 
approach. 
In 33 of 70 cases 
growth increases, in 9 
cases there is no 
change, in 28 cases 
growth was lowered.  
Atoyan & 
Conway 
(2006) 
x x 95 developing countries, 
during 1993-2002. Examine 
effects on: growth, ratio of the 
fiscal surplus to GDP and 
ratio of the current account 
surplus to GDP. 
Censored-
sample, 
instrumental-
variable and 
matching. 
The results are the 
direct effect is weak. 
However, 
improvements are found 
2-3 years after a 
program. 
Conway 
(1994) 
x x 74 developing countries, 
during 1976-1986. Examines 
the motivation for 
participation and the 
macroeconomic effects. 
  Increased participation 
has a negative effect on 
growth. But lagged 
effects are positive. 
 
Dicks-
Mireaux et 
al. (2000) 
x  74 countries, during 1986-
1991. Examine the effect of 
IMF support on economic 
growth, inflation and the 
external debt/service ratio. 
Studies only ESAF programs. 
Modified 
control-
group, GEE. 
Significantly positive 
effects on economic 
growth. 
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Much research finds a negative effect from the IMF programs on growth (see e.g. 
Prezworski & Vreeland 2000, Dreher 2006, Marchesi & Sirtori 2010, Barro & Lee 2003). 
Prezworski & Vreeland (2000) conclude that the stabilising effect obtained from the 
provision of money is not enough to accelerate growth. Dreher (2006) highlights the low 
rates of compliance with policy conditions as an explanation for the negative results. 
Marchesi & Sirtori (2010) argue in the same vein. They also withhold that the IMF focuses 
on fiscal and monetary discipline, which is argued not fitting the structurally characterised 
problems that the poorest countries are likely to face. On the other hand, Barro & Lee 
(2003) argue that growth is directly lowered by negative effects induced on investments 
and indirectly through lowered rate of openness and rule of law.  
Reviewing the progress of the IMF programs in different regions of the world, 
mainly negative results are found (see e.g. Stone 2004 on Africa, Ozturk 2008 on South 
America, Nunnenkamp 1998, Brouwer 2004 on Asia). These negative results are explained 
by the poor preconditions in the regions and a lack of general support for the programs and 
the policy conditions. Nevertheless, there are exceptions showing that the IMF programs in 
general have positive effects on economic growth (see e.g. Dicks-Mireaux et al. 2000, 
Reichmann & Stillson 1987). While some found a lagged positive effect on growth (see 
e.g. Killick et al. 1992, Conway 1994, Atoyan & Conway 2006).  
Based on earlier findings a relationship between the IMF and economic growth is 
assumed. The dispersion of earlier research on the effects on growth encourages us to 
examine in which way they are connected. Starting with an examination of the overall 
effect of IMF programs on economic growth, our aim is to determine whether the effect is 
positive or negative. To widen this examination a set of dummy variables is used in three 
additional models. The second model estimates differences between three decades: 1980, 
1990, and 2000. The third model estimates difference between programs: SBA, ECF, EFF, 
SAF, ESF and FCL. Finally, the fourth model estimates difference between regions: 
Africa, Asia and South America. One type of growth strategy is to initiate economic 
growth with a short-term kick start of the economy, followed by long-term reforms to 
sustain growth (Rodrik 2003). In spirit of this theory the thesis is aimed at estimating the 
short-term
2
 effect on growth.  
The examination is based on a panel consisting of observations from 86 developing 
countries during 1983-2010. The methods of assessment are ordinary least squares (OLS) 
                                                 
2
 Our models consist of three equations, testing the effect on growth without any lags, with a one-year lag 
and with a two-year lag. Thus, the short-term effect is defined as zero up to two years. 
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and two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the sample, 11.63% of the countries have never 
received a loan disbursement from the IMF. The remaining 88.37%, consisting of 76 
countries, have received loan disbursements from at least one of the six different types of 
programs
3
. In earlier research the main focus has been to answer if the IMF has a 
significant effect growth. Yet, no research has been found that controls for the effects on 
growth of the different kinds of programs, nor during the 1980s, 1990s or 2000s. This 
thesis contributes with an examination in these areas. Earlier research has mainly included 
the two most common programs: the Stand-by arrangements (SBA) and Extended fund 
facility (EFF) (see e.g. Barro & Lee 2003, Dreher 2006). But some researchers have 
compared these two programs with the Structural adjustment fund (SAF) and Extended 
structural adjustment fund (ESAF) (see e.g. Evrensel 2002, Evrensel & Kim 2006).  
The following section provides basic information on the IMF and six different kinds 
of programs. Section three provides descriptive evidence of our data. Section four provides 
a theoretical approach on how the IMF can affect growth, our growth model and the 
regression results. The results are presented with a discussion on possible explanations. 
The final section provides a summary and some concluding remarks. 
  
  
                                                 
3
 This study covers Stand-by arrangements (SBA), Extended fund facility (EFF), Flexible credit line (FCL), 
Structural adjustment facility (SAF), Exogenous shock facility (ESF) and the Extended credit facility (ECF).  
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2. Definitions 
2.1 The IMF 
The IMF is an international organization working for economic cooperation and stability. 
It currently consists of 188 member countries (IMF 2013f). The organization was created 
in 1944 as one of the foundations of the Bretton Woods system
4
. The initial purpose of the 
organization was to guarantee the fixed exchange rates and to deal with temporary deficits 
through financial support (Barro & Lee 2003, IMF 2013b). The mandate of the IMF 
changed as the fixed gold standard was dropped. The IMF’s work expanded towards new 
areas (Bauer et al. 2009).  
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the number of loan disbursements during the 
sampled time period 1983-2010.  
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of number of loan disbursements, 1983-2010 
 
 
 
The changes in the number of loan disbursements can be explained together with the 
historic evolution of the IMF. There was an upswing during the beginning of the 1980s. 
                                                 
4
 The Bretton Woods system was created to manage monetary policies and exchange rates on an international 
basis (Stephey 2008)  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
lo
a
n
 d
is
b
u
rs
em
en
ts
  
  
  
  
Year 
 9 
 
This can be explained by the emergence of the Latin American crisis in the early 1980s, 
coupled with the aftermath of the oil price shocks in the late 1970s (Conway 1994, Ozturk 
2008). Yet, as the crisis in Mexico broke out in 1982, the IMF worked to coordinate the 
global response to prevent the crisis from spreading (IMF 2013l). During the 1980s the 
focus towards developing countries became more prominent. In addition to crisis 
management, longer-termed development strategies were adopted in both existing and new 
programs (e.g the structural adjustment facility (SAF)) (Bauer et al. 2009, Fischer 1998). 
The IMF's role in creating economic growth was highlighted further as the size, number 
and maturity time of the loans increased (Dreher 2006, Meltzer 1999).  
With the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s the number of member countries 
increased. This decade is known for the outburst of financial crises in East Asia in 1997. 
During these crises many countries requested assistance from the IMF. However, the 
organization was highly criticized on its performance (IMF 2013m). As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the number of loan disbursements was relatively stable this decade. During the 
beginning of the 2000s the number of loan disbursements decreased, until the outburst of 
the global financial crisis in 2008. The number of loan disbursements increased rapidly and 
the IMF was certainly put on the map again. The lending capacity of the organization was 
tripled (Presbitero & Zazzaro 2012). Consequently a new lending facility, the Flexible 
credit line (FCL), was developed to suit the urgent economic needs in a crisis (Presbitero & 
Zazzaro 2012).   
The main resources of the IMF come from the member states. All new members pay 
a quota
5
 determined by the size of the countries’ economies. Each member has the right to 
freely draw up to 25 % of its paid quota whenever needed. However, if more resources are 
needed, a lending arrangement with the IMF is required. If countries demands loans, they 
negotiates with the IMF and the policy conditions of the programs are decided.  
 
2.2 The loans 
The IMF is an organization in constant development. New lending arrangements are 
developed and already existing ones are restructured. According to the IMF’s Annual 
Report (2012), eight loaning arrangements are currently in action (IMF 2012). However, 
this study includes six different types of loans issued during 1983-2010. The choice of loan 
                                                 
5
 The quota is a member fee that is required for new member of the IMF. 25 % of this quota must be paid 
with the IMF’s own currency called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), while the rest is paid in the member's 
own currency (IMF 2013j). 
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types and time period was determined by the availability of data provided by the IMF for 
the countries included in our sample. These are Stand-by arrangements (SBA), Extended 
fund facility (EFF), Flexible credit line (FCL), Structural adjustment facility (SAF), 
Exogenous shock facility (ESF) and Extended credit facility (ECF). The programs are 
presented with their abbreviations in Table 2 where detailed information about the loans is 
provided.  
The programs can be divided into two subgroups. The SBA, EFF and FCL programs 
are borrowed on non-concessional terms, with an interest rate based on the SDR interest 
rate
6
. While the ECF, SAF and ESF programs are borrowed on concessional terms with a 
zero interest rate (until January 2014). The former are targeted towards middle to high 
income countries and the later towards low-income countries (IMF 2013d, Evrensel & Kim 
2006).  
 
Table 2 – Summary of loan programs  
 
SBA EFF FCL SAF ECF ESF 
Length 1-2 years Up to 3 years 1-2 years Up to 3 years 3-5 years 1-2 years 
Repayment 3 - 5 years 4 - 10 years 3 - 5 years 5,5 - 10 years 5-10 years 5-10 years 
Designed for 
Middle to 
high income 
countries 
Middle to 
high income 
countries 
Conditions 
on sound 
institutions 
Low-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Low-income 
countries 
Disbursements Quarterly Quarterly 
Single 
disbursement 
Annual 
Semi-annual 
or quarterly 
Phased 
Time period Short-term Medium-term Short-term 
Medium- to 
long term 
Medium term Short-term 
Interest rate 
Non-
concessional 
Non-
concessional 
Non-
concessional 
Concessional Concessional Concessional 
(IMF 2012, IMF 2013h, IMF 2001) 
The SBA programs are designed for countries experiencing short-term balance of payment 
problems. These programs range between one to two years and repayments are due within 
three to five years (Barro & Lee 2003, Prezworski & Vreeland 2000). This type of program 
is aimed to restore financial confidence and stability. It can also function as a 
precautionary measure since countries have the option to withdraw the money if it 
                                                 
6
 The SDR interest rate is calculated every week. The rate of charge for the non-concessional loans is equal to 
the SDR interest rate plus a margin. The rate of charge was 1.07%  (13-05-05) (IMF 2013g). 
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becomes necessary. The purpose of these programs is to signal to investors that 
improvements in the economic environment are to come (Fischer 1997).  
The EFF programs are designed for countries experiencing long-termed balance of 
payments problems. It is also aimed at supporting major structural reforms. This structural 
agenda is reflected in the conditions attached to the programs. The programs last up to four 
years with repayments due after four to ten years (IMF 2012).  
The FCL programs are designed for countries experiencing all types of balance of 
payments problems. As with the SBAs, it can either be aimed at solving already existing 
issues, or to serve as a precautionary measure. However, the program is new in its design 
since it has a prequalification criterion instead of the conditionality principle. The countries 
qualifying for these loans must have strong institutions since they are trusted to implement 
the correct policies to restore balance (John and Knedlik 2011). The programs are issued in 
one disbursement with repayment between three to five years (IMF 2013d). 
The SAF programs are some of the first targeted towards low-income countries. The 
SAF programs are the only lending arrangement in our sample that is no longer in use
7
. 
These programs could last up to three years, with repayment between five to ten years 
(IMF 2001). The loans were borrowed on concessional terms and resembled foreign aid 
(Barro & Lee 2003, IMF 2004).  
The ECF programs are targeted towards low-income countries. These programs are 
designed for countries experiencing prolonged balance of payments problems. The 
programs last three to five years and repayments are due within five to ten years (IMF 
2013d, IMF 2013h). As with the EFF programs, the conditions attached are focused on 
structural policy reforms. However, in addition these programs include poverty reduction 
policies (IMF 2012).  
The ESF is a new type of program designed for low-income countries facing urgent 
balance of payments problems caused by external shocks (IMF 2013d). These programs 
range between one to two years and repayments are due within five to ten years (IMF 
2013k).  
                                                 
7
 These programs were active during 1986-1995 (IMF 2004).   
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3. Descriptive Evidence 
This section provides descriptive evidence of our data set. The data for the control 
variables is collected from the databases: Penn World Tables, Barro & Lee and the World 
Bank. The original resources are presented in Appendix C. Data on the loan disbursements 
are collected using IMFs own records, displayed on their webpage (see Appendix A). The 
panel includes 86 countries, during 1983-2010 and is balanced. 
To get an understanding of the data, Appendix A presents a table with all the 
countries included. It also specifies which region the countries belong to, what kind of 
programs they have received and during what years the programs were in action. Our 
analysis is based on this information. Restricting the examination to only include 
developing countries contributes to a homogeneous dataset. It also facilitates the analysis, 
as countries with similar income levels tend to grow in a similar manner (Jones 2002, p. 
127-132). The countries included in our analysis are ranging from low to upper-middle 
income economies (i.e. 1.025 dollar or less to a maximum of 12.475 dollars a day) (World 
Bank 2013a).  
Cross-section data often suffers from problems of heteroskedasticity, while time-
series data often have problems with non-stationarity and autocorrelation (Verbeek 2008, 
p. 88-89, 104-105, 270-271). Therefore non-stationarity, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are controlled for and detailed information on the tests performed can be 
found in Appendix B. These problems are corrected for by logging and differentiating the 
series and using White’s standard errors (diagonal) in all the regressions.  
The data on loan disbursements show which countries that have received financial 
support from the IMF. A total number of 166 loan disbursements have been issued during 
1983-2010. Most commonly one program is active at the time though there are examples 
of countries being in multiple arrangements (e.g. Burundi that had both a SBA and SAF 
program during 1986-1988, see Appendix A). The distribution of loan types in our sample 
show that SBAs have been granted to 80.23% of the countries, ECFs to 45.35%, EFFs to 
29.10%, SAFs to 31.40%, ESFs to 4.65% and FCLs to 2.33% (see Appendix A). 
The programs are active during different time periods. In our data the SBAs and 
EFFs are active the entire time period. The SAF programs are active only during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Both the ESF and FCL programs are rather new arrangements and have only 
been active since the 2000s. (See Appendix A). 
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Figure 2 – Regional distribution of IMF lending, 1983-2010 
 
The distribution of the countries 
included in our sample is not entirely 
identical when dividing the sample into 
three regions. Figure 2 illustrates the 
regional distribution of all the countries 
that have received at least one loan 
disbursement. As can be seen the work 
of the IMF is biased towards Africa in 
our sample.  
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4. The IMF and economic growth 
4.1. Theoretical channels of impact 
A wide amount of theoretical literature highlights several channels through which the IMF 
influences economic growth in either a positive or negative way. In sprit of Dreher (2006) 
four main channels of impact are presented. Both positive and negative aspects are 
highlighted to get a full image of the IMF’s ability to promote growth. 
The first channel focuses on the provision of money, including the creation of credit 
and liquidity. This channel can be viewed as an immediate, short-term solution aimed at 
stabilising the economic development. Thereby, it creates the necessary conditions for 
sustained economic growth (Fischer 1997). On the other hand, there is a risk that the effect 
is diffused. The provision of money can create disincentives to reform the economy, which 
can result in governments keeping inappropriate policies. Such moral hazards can appear if 
the performance criteria are not enforced, i.e. the actual costs of entering a program are 
lower than the expected (Dreher 2006, Stone 2004).  
Furthermore, the existence of the IMF, acting as a lender of last resort, can create 
another type of moral hazard. This can create incentives for countries to adopt infeasible 
economic policies long before any loan arrangement is required (Evrensel & Kim 2006, 
Dreher 2006). Thus, if sound policies are not adopted the issue of moral hazards can lead 
to the creation of a dependency on the IMF (Stone 2004). 
Second, the programs also serve as insurance. By setting its “seal of approval” the 
IMF enhances the credibility of the countries’ financial policies and development. The 
programs ensure, and can even attract more investors (Bauer et. al 2009, Bird & Rowlands 
2001). The programs can have an essential function to enable countries to acquire other 
public and private loans as well (Fischer 1997). On the other hand, participating in an IMF 
program can be viewed as a sign of economic distress. This indicates that the “seal of 
approval” set by the IMF does not carry enough market value to affect investors’ 
expectations (Bird 1996, Bauer et. al 2009). 
Third, the conditions attached to the programs reassure the commitment to a 
particular set of macroeconomic policies. However, increasing economic growth is not 
included under the programs conditionality principles. Growth is instead set as an 
indicative target and a desired outcome of the actual performance criteria (Fischer 1997, 
Evrensel 2002). The conditions can include both fiscal austerity and tighter monetary 
 15 
 
policies through measures such as: cutting government expenditures, increasing taxes, 
raising interest rates and devaluing currencies (Abbott et al 2009, Prezworski & Vreeland 
2000).  
As the focus of the IMF’s work changed, it more commonly promoted structural 
policies. Typical reforms were changing the patterns of government spending, restructuring 
banking systems as well as liberalizing prices and trade (Bird 1996, Fischer 1997). 
However, the effectiveness of the programs to affect growth is dependent on the rate of 
compliance with the policy conditions (Jorra 2011). The rate of compliance differs across 
countries, indicating that it dependent on the prerequisites of the borrowing countries, such 
as their institutions and type of regime. For instance, democracies with reliable institutions 
are found to have a tendency to do better than other types of regimes (Bauer et al. 2009).  
Fourth, the IMF can influence growth by providing information through surveillance 
and financial advice to its member countries. This is done by monitoring the international 
monetary system and changes in economic policies. Through forecasts, instabilities can be 
detected and measures to prevent their outbursts can be taken (IMF 2013b).  
 
4.2 The growth model 
In spirit of Neo-classical theory, the model applied in this study is based on the classical 
Solow growth model with technology, where a Cobb-Douglas production function is 
assumed:           . The model is built on three main factors of influence: stock of 
capital (K), labour (L), and technology (A). The technological progress is assumed to be 
exogenous in the model. (Jones 2002, p. 36) However, it will be considered in more 
general terms as the total factor productivity (TFP) in our model.  
The TFP is aimed at capturing the efficiency of a country’s inputs, including both 
physical and human capital (Jones 2002, p. 146-147). Thus, the effects of the four 
theoretical channels are captured by the TFP, represented by A in the production function. 
The channels are assumed to enhance a productive use of resources and to encourage 
reforms on policies currently preventing a country from developing.  
To capture the effect of these channels, a set of dummy variables is used. To make 
this study possible the analysis is divided into four models. All the models have the 
purpose to examine if the IMF promotes growth. Model 1 tests the general effect on 
growth when given an additional annual loan disbursement. Model 2 tests the specific 
effects for three decades. This is done by including dummy variables for 1980, 1990 and 
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2000. Model 3 tests the effects of different kinds of loans, including dummy variables for 
the six different lending arrangements: SBA, ECF, EFF, SAF, ESF and FCL. Model 4 tests 
the effects of three regions, including dummy variables for Africa, Asia and South 
America. The dummy variables take the value one for each year a country receives a loan 
disbursement, and zero for all other years. 
To be able to examine the effects of the dummy variables on growth, control 
variables are needed. The control variables chosen are based on earlier research (see e.g. 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004, p. 521-533). The variables represent a country’s physical and 
human capital stock, general health and infrastructure. In all the regression models the 
following control variables will be used: the stock of capital (   ), average total years of 
schooling (     )
8
, fertility rate (       , rate of openness (      )
9
 and life expectancy at 
birth (      ). In accordance with Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004) the stock of real capital, 
education, openness and life expectancy are expected to have a positive effect on economic 
growth, while fertility rate is expected to have a negative effect. 
To enable the use of a linear regression model, the production function is 
transformed. The descriptive alternations of all the variables and sources can be seen in 
detail in Appendix C. While the descriptive data on all the variables can be found in 
Appendix D.  The general model tested is: 
 
   (           (          (            (           (             (             (            
 
              
 
where     represents GDP per capita growth in country i at period t.       represents the 
groups of dummy variables tested in each of the four models (the specific regression 
models can be seen in Appendix F).  Since the countries in our sample cannot be 
considered randomly chosen, fixed effects are used. Therefore, a fixed effects two way 
error component model is applied. The two way error component includes: a time 
independent country fixed effect (  ,) which allows the countries to have an individual 
intercept; a time dependent fixed effect (  ), which allows time dependent effects that are 
common to all the countries; the ordinary disturbance term (    , which varies with 
countries and time.  
                                                 
8
 Human capital is often explained in growth models as time spent on education; see e.g. the Solow model 
with human capital and the Lucas model (1988) in Jones 2002, p. 55, 161  
9
 Openness is measured as export minus import divided by GDP (University of Pennsylvania 2008). 
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The regression analysis is conducted using both OLS and 2SLS estimations. The 
methods differ on the requirements of the explanatory variables. The OLS yields reliable 
results with exogenous explanatory variables. This means that they are determined outside 
the model and that they are not correlated with the error term (Hill et al. 2008, p. 276). 
However, there is a risk that the dummy variables are not exogenous since the IMF 
programs often are concluded in periods of economic crisis. This means that the dummy 
variables affect growth, while at the same time growth affects the dummy variables. If this 
is the case the dummy variables reflect the negative effects of the underlying crisis (Dreher 
2006). 
The 2SLS, on the other hand, can account for endogenous explanatory variables. By 
including instrumental variables the effects of the dummy variables on growth is isolated 
and the estimates yield consistent results. An instrumental variable should be correlated 
with the endogenous variable but not with the error term. In addition, it should not have a 
direct effect on the explained variable (Hills et al. 2008, p. 278). In our growth model 
internal instruments are used, represented by lagged dummy variables. The choice of 
instruments is motivated by the high probability that the dummy variables are correlated 
with its own lags. However, it is unlikely that the need for a loan is based on information 
on future growth. Rather the decision is based on the issues seen today. Hence, the dummy 
variables do not have a direct effect on the explained variable. 
 
4.3 Regression results 
The regression results are divided into four sections representing each model. Since the 
focus of this thesis is to examine the effects on growth from programs, the results of the 
dummy variables is at focus. The estimates for the dummy variables alone are shown in 
Table 3-6 and each table represents one model. However the full results, including both 
control variables and dummy variables, can be seen in Appendix E.  
Three columns are presented in each table, representing the different equations 
estimated in each model. The first equation examines the direct effect on growth, the 
second equation the one-year lagged effect and the third equation the two-year lagged 
effect. This means that the effect of the loan disbursements on growth is seen with one 
respectively two year’s hindsight. The lagged estimates test the sensitivity of the results. If 
the estimates are consistent among the lags the results are considered to be robust. The left 
part of each column shows the OLS estimates and the right part the 2SLS estimates. The 
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main focus of the analysis is the results of the 2SLS estimates since they account for 
endogeneity.  
Even though the focus is on the dummy variables, some concluding remarks must be 
made on the control variables. The results are in general inconclusive. The stock of capital, 
education, fertility rate and life expectancy all have positive effects on growth. However 
the results are not robust, since the lagged estimates change signs and are non-significant. 
As described in Appendix C, the stock of capital was calculated and education 
interpolated. The stock of capital, education and life expectancy have high standard errors 
and show inconclusive results. The positive estimates for fertility rate stands in contrast to 
earlier research (see e.g. Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004, p. 525). Only openness has a 
negative effect on growth. However, when lagging one year the effect is positive and 
significant. 
The estimated coefficient of the intercept is approximately 0.012, representing an 
averaged intercept for the countries in the panel. Since not all countries in our sample have 
received loans there is no reference dummy and the intercept is included. This means that 
the estimates for the dummy variables are interpreted as an additional effect on growth. All 
regression equations show low R-square values. The low rates of explanation can be due to 
high variance in the data which is common for developing countries. Bird & Rowlands 
(2001) points out that a feature among some earlier research on the IMF and growth, is a 
poor overall explanatory power. This problem is explained to be caused by omitted 
variables. A growth model can include many explanatory factors, and it is impossible to 
capture them all. 
 
4.3.1 Model 1 
This model tests the overall effect of the annual loan disbursements on economic growth. 
The results are presented in Table 3. 
All estimates show that the loan disbursements have a positive and significant effect 
on economic growth at the one percentage level. The largest effect on growth is obtained 
by the 2SLS estimate of the first equation. The coefficient, 0.019 (0.004), indicates that the 
effect of an annual loan disbursement raises growth with 1.9 % during the same year. The 
2SLS estimates show that the positive effect on growth is slowly decreasing with the 
number of lags. While the positive effect of the OLS estimates is slowly increasing with 
the number of lags. 
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Table 3 – Results for model 1 
Equations 1 2 3 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
IMF 0.008***  0.019*** 0.008***  0.019*** 0.008***  0.019*** 
s.e. (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) 
IMF(-1)     0.012***   0.018*** 0.012***  0.018***  
s.e.     (0.003)   (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004)  
IMF(-2)         0.012***  0.013***  
s.e.         (0.003)  (0.005)  
            
 Observations 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 
R-squared 0.133 0.129 0.135 0.134 0.127 0.127 
Number of countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
 
The similarity of both estimations allows for an interpretation of the results in general 
terms rather than separating each estimator. This also indicates that endogeneity is not 
affecting the results. The results of the first equation are not sensitive to the lagged effects 
in the second and third equation. The non-sensitivity confirms the robustness of the results.  
Our result stands in contrast to much earlier research, which find a negative effect on 
growth (see e.g. Prezworski & Vreeland 2000, Dreher 2006, Marchesi & Sirtori 2010, 
Barro & Lee 2003). Though, this examination is based on a yearly data while much of the 
earlier findings have a longer-termed focus, using five-year averaged data (see e.g. Barro 
& Lee 2003, Dreher 2006). Our model is aimed at examining the short-term effect, 
observed directly and with lagged effect. Earlier findings that confirm a positive effect 
have in the same vein observed a positive lagged effect on growth (see e.g. Atoyan & 
Conway 2006, Conway 1994, Killick et al. 1990). 
The significantly positive results provide an indication that some of the theoretical 
channels work. The desired effect of the providence of money, aimed at achieving an 
immediate stabilizing solution is confirmed in our results. For instance, this goal can be 
achieved by the creation of liquidity (Dreher 2006). If a country has economic issues its 
credit valuation can be downgraded. This, along with the instability of the commercial 
markets, creates a gap that the IMF fills through the providence of money and by its “seal 
of approval”. Thus, these stabilizing effects of the programs are of considerable importance 
for many countries (Bird 1996).  
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Decreasing creditworthiness is a key factor driving the demand for IMF loans and the 
severity of the problems increases the persistency of the demand (Bird 1996). Instability 
discourages investments and lowers growth (IMF 2013e). In addition, countries with poor 
prerequisites, in terms of low rates of investments and slow growth, need support from the 
IMF (Bird 1996). These countries need money, certification or precautionary loan 
agreements to attract and send signal to investors, raising their expectations (Bird & 
Rowlands 2001, Fischer 1997). Our results indicate positive effect of the “seal-of-
approval”, set by participation in programs, since it signals to markets and investors that 
the economic issues are to be overcome.  
The positive results cannot neither confirm nor reject the existence of moral hazards. 
Either it can be an indication that moral hazards are not common in our sampled countries, 
or it can be a pure reflection of the providence of money easing acute issues. This enables 
countries to keep unwise policies longer, in order to qualify for more IMF programs further 
ahead (Meltzer 1999, Evrensel 2002). 
In the same sense, no confirmable conclusions can be drawn regarding the rate of 
compliance with policies attached to the programs. A high compliance rate is assumed to 
increases the effectiveness of the programs. Though, the positive effects in our results 
slowly decrease with the number of lags. This might be an indication that the rate of 
compliance is low and the policies necessary to uphold sustained growth are not 
implemented. Hence, explaining the decline in the size of the positive effect. 
 
4.3.2 Model 2 
This model examines the impact of the loan disbursements by controlling for each decade 
in our sample. This model investigates whether or not the IMF’s work has been more or 
less successful throughout time. The results are presented in Table 4. 
In accordance with Model 1, both the OLS and 2SLS estimates shows similar results 
and nearly all the estimates are positive. Most of the 2SLS estimates are of greater size. 
These estimates also yield significant results in more cases. Furthermore, the negative 
result for the 2SLS estimate for the 1990s indicates that endogeneity is affecting the 
results. Though, none of the estimates yield significant results for the 1990s. Therefore, we 
can conclude that the IMF’s work was successful in raising economic growth during the 
1980s and 2000s.  
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Table 4 – Results for model 2 
Equations 1 2 3 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
IMF80 0.005 0.021**  0.005 0.021**  0.005 0.021**  
s.e. (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  
IMF80(-1)     0.015***  0.036***  0.015***  0.036***  
s.e.     (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.010)  
IMF80(-2)         0.022***  0.019*  
s.e.         (0.006)  (0.010)  
IMF90 0.006 0.016  0.006 0.016  0.006 0.016  
s.e. (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010)  
IMF90(-1)     0.008  0.000  0.008  0.000  
s.e.     (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  
IMF90(-2)         0.002  -0.005  
s.e.         (0.005)  (0.009)  
IMF00 0.011*** 0.020***  0.011*** 0.020***  0.011*** 0.020***  
s.e. (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  
IMF00(-1)     0.013***  0.022***  0.013***  0.022***  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
IMF00(-2)         0.015***  0.027***  
s.e.         (0.004)  (0.006)  
        
Observations 2408 2408  2408 2408 2408 2408 
R-squared  0.133 0.129  0.135 0.128 0.130 0.128 
Number of countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
 
The estimated coefficients for the 1980s and 2000s are all positive. The 2SLS estimates are 
not sensitive to lagging the effect one and two years. This confirms the robustness of these 
results. The 1980s includes fewer years, since our sampled period starts in 1983. This 
restricts the number of observations during this decade. The OLS estimate is non-
significant for the 1980s, which suggest the superiority of the 2SLS estimator. The largest 
estimated coefficient for 1980s is obtained by using a one-year lag, 0.036 (0.009). The 
coefficient is significant at the one percentage level. The effect on growth is decreasing in 
both directions, indicating that the positive effect on growth after one year is larger than 
both the direct and two-year lagged effect. The largest estimated coefficient for 2000s is 
obtained by using two lags, 0.027 (0.006). The coefficient is significant at the one 
percentage level. The effect is slowly increasing with the number of lags, indicating an 
accumulating effect from the IMF’s work.  
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The 1980s is characterized by a structurally oriented development of IMF programs, 
aimed at fostering growth. This development is targeted towards low-income countries 
(Easterly 2005). Typically occurring programs during this decade are SBAs and ECFs. A 
pattern can be seen for these programs, as they are often given after each other (see 
Appendix A). This setup can confirm the structurally based focus of the IMF’s work, 
which corresponds to established growth strategy
10
. The SBA programs are aimed at 
solving short-term issues, while the ECFs are aimed at longer-termed structural reforms. 
Our results show a large positive effect on growth with a one-year lag. This result can 
serve as an indication that the shorter-termed problems are corrected. The positive effect is 
smaller with a two-year lag. Hence the positive effect on growth decreases slowly 
suggesting that further assistance is needed, which the combination with ECF programs 
provides.  
Examining the 1990s none of the estimates are significant. The first equation shows 
that the direct effect is positive. The effect is then decreasing with the number of lags and 
is negative with a two-year lag. Hence, these results leave no confirmable conclusions for 
this decade.  
In contrast, a positive effect on growth is shown during the 2000s. Based on the 
emergence of the financial crisis in 2008, the explanation of the overall positive results is 
twofold. On the one hand, there is usually a boom before the bust. Heading towards the 
crisis growth rates flourished contributing to a general positive development. On the other 
hand, it can be explained by the development of a consensus on the economic institutions 
necessary for stable growth. Some examples are setting inflation targets, higher rate of 
surveillance of the financial markets and restricting budget deficits (Borio & White 2004). 
These kinds of targets facilitate the IMF’s work, as it creates a general confidence in the 
policies attached to the programs. The positive effect shown in our results is increasing 
with the number of lags. This accumulating effect of the IMF’s work also indicates a high 
efficiency of the attached policies during this decade in promoting growth. 
 
4.3.3 Model 3 
This model examines the effect from the different kinds of programs on growth. The 
results are presented in Table 5. This model is restricted to using one-year lags. Since 
                                                 
10
 In Rodrik (2003) a growth strategy is presented. It emphasizes the enforcement of policies that kick-start 
the economy (in the way the SBA’s do by solving short-term problems), while at the same implementing 
long-term policies that can sustain the increased economic growth (in the same way as the ECF’s structural 
reforms). 
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many countries have received more than one type of program the number of dummy 
variables is large. Therefore, it is not possible to run the regressions with two-year lags as 
it causes a dummy trap. 
 
Table 5 – Results for model 3 
Equations 1 2 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
SBA  -0.000 0.013**   -0.000 0.013**  
s.e.  (0.003) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.005)  
SBA(-1)     0.009**  0.019***  
s.e.     (0.003)  (0.006)  
EFF  0.002 0.010   0.002 0.010  
s.e.  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006)  
EFF(-1)     0.004  0.001  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.012)  
ECF  0.016*** 0.016**   0.016*** 0.016**  
s.e.  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006)  
ECF(-1)     0.011**  0.013**  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)  
SAF  0.003 0.009   0.003 0.009  
s.e.  (0.012) (0.020)   (0.012) (0.020)  
SAF(-1)     0.004  -0.005  
s.e.     (0.014)  (0.021)  
ESF  -0.010 -0.013   -0.010 -0.013  
s.e.  (0.020) (0.036)   (0.020) (0.036)  
ESF(-1)     -0.008  0.003  
s.e.     (0.024)  (0.061)  
FCL  -0.012 0.019*   -0.012 0.019*  
s.e.  (0.020) (0.011)   (0.020) (0.011)  
FCL(-1)     0.004  -0.745
11
  
s.e.     (0.015)  (2.205)  
      
Observations  2408 2408  2408 2408  
R-squared  0.135 0.130  0.134 0.039  
Number of countries 86 86 86 86 
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
 
 
In general the results show that three loan types have a positive effect on growth: SBAs, 
                                                 
11
 The FCL program has only been issued to Mexico and Columbia, during 2009-2010. When lagging the 
dummy variables, half of the already few observations is lost. This can explain the large standard errors and 
the low R-squared value. If the FCL dummy is excluded, the R-squared value is similar to the result in Model 
1 (0.129). 
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EFFs and ECFs. Though, the effects are only significant for two of them: SBAs and ECFs. 
The largest estimated coefficient for the SBAs is obtained with a one-year lag, 0.019 
(0.006). The coefficient is significant at the one percentage level. The effect is slowly 
increasing with the number of lags. This indicates an accumulating effect from the IMF’s 
work.  
The positive effect can be explained by the characteristics of the countries receiving 
these loans. The SBAs have a short-term focus and are designed for countries with less 
severe issues, which can be solved by temporary economic relief and stabilizing support. 
Hence, the aims of these programs can be interpreted as smoothing the economic 
development. In addition, some earlier research has found that SBA programs do provide a 
balance of payments relief during the program years (see e.g. Evrensel 2002). These 
programs also offer the possibility to withdraw disbursement as a precautionary measure if 
it becomes needed. There are many countries in our sample which have received this loan, 
confirming the reliability of the results. 
The largest estimated coefficient for the ECFs is obtained without lags, 0.016 
(0.006). The coefficient is significant at the five percentage level. The significantly 
positive estimates of the SBAs and the ECFs are not sensitive to lagging the effect one 
year. Thus, confirming the robustness of these estimates. 
The ECF programs show consistently positive effects on growth, indicating positive 
effects of the structural approach. Most of the low-income countries have received this 
type of program (see Appendix A). Arguably many of these countries have not suffered 
from severe crises. Rather the loans issued to these countries have wider aims, i.e. helping 
the countries restructure their economies. Our results conclude that these programs have 
short-term effects on growth as well. This stands in contrast to earlier findings, where the 
IMF is criticized for not developing programs that suit low-income countries (see e.g. 
Marchesi & Sirtori 2010).  
In contrast to the SBAs, the effect of the ECFs is slowly decreasing with the number 
of lags. This indicates a decreasing effect from the IMF’s work. In summary we conclude 
that both SBA and ECF programs promote growth during and at least one year after an 
agreement.  
For the remaining programs the results are not straight forward. For the SAFs, ESFs 
and FCLs the two estimators show different signs. This indicates that the OLS estimates 
are affected by endogeneity, confirming the superiority of the 2SLS estimates. No robust 
results on the effects of these loans can be confirmed, since the estimates change signs 
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when using one-year lags. Furthermore, the EFFs, SAFs and ESFs show non-significant 
results.  
The results for the FCL programs are ambiguous. The direct effect shows a 
significantly positive result, 0.019 (0.011). However, the effect on growth with a one-year 
lag is negative but non-significant. The results of these loans are based on a small sample. 
Only two countries, Mexico and Colombia, have received the program. This limited 
selection indicates that the results should be interpreted with caution, as it reflects the 
development in these two countries. Therefore, we cannot draw any confirmable 
conclusions on the effects of this program.  
The EFFs program shows a positive but non-significant effect on growth. A common 
critique against the IMF is that the rate of compliance with the conditionality principle is 
low (see e.g Dreher 2006). The EFF programs have broken down more frequently than the 
SBA’s, indicating the inefficiency of the EFF programs (Bird 1996). Furthermore, during 
the period 1986-1994 the SAF programs were frequently interrupted, one or several 
occasions, during the agreed lending period. Most of the interruptions were caused by 
slippage on the conditions, and some were due to disagreements (Dreher 2006). This can 
not only explain the non-significant result for SAF programs, but also the negative and 
insignificant estimate obtained with the one-year lag.  
The ESF programs show a negative direct effect on growth, and a positive lagged 
effect. Though, none of the estimates are significant. The ESF programs are aimed at 
solving short-term issues in low-income countries experiencing external shocks. Hence, the 
borrowing countries have relatively poor pre-requisites when entering the programs. In our 
sample three countries in Africa: Malawi, Mozambique and Senegal, and one in Asia, 
Maldives, have received this program (see Appendix A). Based on this, the probability of 
promoting growth, after only one year in the program, is presumably small. No 
confirmable conclusions on the effect of this program on growth can be drawn.  
 
4.3.4 Model 4 
This model investigates whether or not the IMF’s work has been more or less successful in 
Africa, Asia and South America. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Our results indicate differences in the size of the effect on growth among the regions. 
This is in contrast to earlier findings (see e.g. Conway 1994). Both Asia and South 
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America have positive and significant estimates, where the effect on growth for South 
America is larger than the effects for Asia.  
 
Table 6 – Results for Model 4 
Equations 1 2 3 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Africa 0.016*** 0.014  0.016*** 0.014  0.016*** 0.014  
s.e. (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  
Africa(-1)     0.007  0.006  0.007  0.006  
s.e.     (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.009)  
Africa(-2)         0.004  0.000  
s.e.         (0.005)  (0.009)  
Asia -0.005 0.005  -0.005 0.005  -0.005 0.005  
s.e. (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  
Asia(-1)     0.005  0.017**  0.005  0.017**  
s.e.     (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  
Asia(-2)         0.013**  0.019***  
s.e.         (0.005)  (0.007)  
South America 0.005 0.023***  0.005 0.023***  0.005 0.023***  
s.e. (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  
South America(-1)     0.016***  0.023***  0.016***  0.023***  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
South America(-2)         0.016***  0.018***  
s.e.         (0.004)  (0.006)  
        
Observations 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 
R-squared 0.134 0.130 0.134 0.132 0.126 0.126 
Number of countries 86  86  86  86  86  86  
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
 
For Africa the effect is positive but decreasing with the number of lags and approaches 
zero with the two-year lag. Though, none of the results are significant. The positive effect 
stands in contrast to earlier findings on the region, which conclude a negative association 
between the IMF and growth (see e.g. Stone 2004). Arguably, there are two main 
explanations for the non-significant results. Firstly, that the programs have not been 
successful enough to promote significant effect on growth in this region. Secondly, the 
IMF’s work is complicated by the relatively low pre-requisites among the large ratio of 
low-income countries in Africa. Many of the countries lack fundamental institutions and 
the economic instruments needed to implement the reforms attached to the programs 
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(Stone 2004). In summary, we cannot draw any confirmable conclusions on the effect 
since the results are not significant. 
The overall effect in Asia is positive. The OLS estimate in the first equation show a 
negative effect. This can be explained by the emergence of the Asian crisis in 1997. Hence, 
due to endogeneity the OLS estimate picks up the effect of the underlying crisis. Once 
endogeneity is managed the 2SLS show significantly positive effects of the lagged 
estimates. The effect is increasing with the number of lags, from 1.7% with a one-year lag 
to 1.9% with a two-year lag.  
During the Asian crisis the programs emphasized trade liberalization and stable 
exchange rates (Fischer 1998). Our results indicate that these reforms have positive effects. 
An example of a country suffering the consequences of the Asian crisis is Indonesia and at 
the time the country had two different programs during this time. Indonesia had negative 
economic growth rate in 1997-1998, while a positive during the 2000s
12
. The Indonesian 
case also seems to stand in line with the effects found in Model 2. The estimates for the 
1990s decrease with the number of lags and are negative with a two-year lag, while the 
estimates for the 2000s are all significantly positive. In summary, the positive development 
for countries such as Indonesia can reflect the overall positive results of the IMF’s work in 
the region. 
Both the OLS and 2SLS estimates show positive results for South America. All three 
2SLS estimates for South America are significant at the one percentage level. These 
estimates are not sensitive to lagging the effect either one or two years. Therefore, the 
2SLS yields robust results for the effect of South America. The highest effect on growth is 
2.3%, obtained both in the program year and the year after. The effect of the two-year 
lagged estimate is lower, indicating a decreasing effect from the IMF’s work. Earlier 
findings confirm short-term positive effects on the current account, balance of payments 
and investments (see e.g. Ozturk 2008). Investors are attracted to countries where a longer-
term payoff is possible (Bauer et al 2009). Our positive result indicates that the IMF can 
restore investors’ confidence.  
In summary, both the Asian and South American regions have better prerequisite 
compared to the African region. This facilitates the implementation of policy reforms, 
since they have stronger fundamentals. In our sample three countries: Brazil, India and 
                                                 
12
 According to our calculations found on data from Penn World Tables, the annual GDP per capita growth in 
Indonesia was in 1998: -0.156  and in 2002: 0,0212.  
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China, all part of the Brics
13
, are often referred to as ‘growth miracles’ with a strong 
positive development. By including these countries in our sample the mean growth rates in 
the regions is raised. The overall positive results for the region can be explained by these 
successful countries. The consistency in results concludes that the IMF is successful in 
both Asia and South America.  
  
                                                 
13
 The Brics consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It is an association of fast-growing 
economies (Desai 2013). 
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5. Conclusion 
The success of the IMF’s lending arrangements has been subject to much debate. The IMF 
began its work with a main focus on helping governments to restore balance of payments 
problems but throughout time its purpose expanded beyond crisis management. Today, the 
IMF works in both industrialized and developing countries, with the overall aim to increase 
economic growth and living standards. In this thesis the short-term effects on growth of the 
IMF’s lending arrangements in developing countries is analysed. 
In theory, the IMF can influence economic growth via several channels. This thesis 
identifies four: provide money through loan disbursements, work as an insurance for 
investors, attach policy conditions to programs and monitor the world economy. Much 
research has examined the effect of the IMF’s work on growth, but the results are 
ambiguous. By performing a wide examination and analysing the different aspects of the 
lending arrangements, it is possible to conclude that the IMF has been successful in 
promoting growth. The effect on growth from an additional annual loan disbursement is 
significantly positive. Though there are qualitative, historical and regional deviations. 
One of the main contributions of this thesis is the analysis of the different kinds of 
loans. Two lending arrangements, Stand-by arrangements (SBA) and Extended credit 
facility (ECF) have significantly positive effects on growth. These programs also represent 
the major directions of the IMF: providing monetary relief and structural development. The 
results indicate that the IMF has been successful in achieving the aims of these policies in 
the short-run. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows a significantly positive result on growth when 
controlling for the 1980s and 2000s. By dividing the data in shorter time periods we 
capture the evolvement of the IMF’s work and can conclude a positive tendency. During 
the late 1980s the focus of the IMF’s work changed towards promoting growth in 
developing countries. New lending arrangements were established and the reach of the 
policy conditions were widened. This process of adjustment is reflected in the positive 
results on growth during the 2000s. 
The IMF is successful in raising economic growth in Asia and South America. 
Though, despite these positive results it is never possible to entirely protect countries from 
the negative effects of external factors. The outburst of an economic crisis or a natural 
disaster in one part of the world can influence the world economy. This can obstruct the 
work of the IMF, even if programs are well-designed. These external factors highlight the 
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importance of surveillance of the member countries and the world economy. Furthermore, 
the individual preconditions of the member countries cannot be completely accounted for. 
This can be an explanation for the non-significant results for the African region, leading to 
the conclusion that individual factors need to be taken into account. In general, immersing 
to regional and local conditions can be of importance to get a deeper understanding of how 
the IMF can promote growth. 
Potential issues with endogenous variables are often highlighted in research on the 
IMF’s work. In this thesis internal instruments are used, by adding the lagged dummy 
variables for loan disbursements. This provides suitable instruments, but not perfect ones. 
It is difficult to find efficient instruments and this has to be taken into account in the 
analysis. In addition, a constraining factor is the availability and quality of data for 
developing countries. A higher variance is expected in this data.  Since some of the lending 
arrangements are fairly new, few observations are available. This constraint on the data 
hampers the possibility to draw confirmable conclusions and can explain some of the non-
significant results. 
Economic growth is a wide subject and many explanatory factors can be included in 
models. Though all models are simplifications of the real conditions observed. This means 
that there is always a risk that important explanatory factors are left out, lowering the 
power of explanation. Even though this thesis contributes to a wider knowledge on the 
subject, unexplained factors remain.  In spirit of Bird & Rowlands (2001), the nature of the 
subject suggests that development of even wider models is useful to further investigate the 
connection between the IMF and economic growth. 
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Appendix A – Summary of countries, regions and programs  
 
 Country
14
 Region
15
 SBA EFF ECF SAF ESF FCL 
 
         
1 Afghanistan Asia   (2006-2010    
2 Albania  (1992- 1993) (2006-2009) (1993-1996, 1998-2009)    
3 Algeria Africa (1989-1992, 1994-1995) (1995-1998)     
4 Argentina South 
America 
(1984-1992, 1996-1998, 
2000-2006) 
(1992-1996, 1998-2000)     
5 Bangladesh Asia (1985-1987)  (1990-1993, 2003-2007) (1987-1990)   
6 Belize Central 
America 
(1984-1986)      
7 Benin Africa   (1993-2010) (1989-1992)   
8 Bolivia South 
America 
(1986-1987, 2003-2006)  (1988-2002) (1986-1988)   
9 Botswana Africa       
10 Brazil South 
America 
(1988-1990, 1992-1993, 
1998-2005) 
(1983-1986)     
11 Bulgaria  (1991-1998, 2002-2007) (1998-2001)     
12 Burundi Africa (1986-1988)  (1991-1994, 2004-2010) (1986-1989)   
13 Cambodja Asia   (1994-1997, 1999-2003)    
14 Cameroon Africa (1988-1992, 1994-1996)  (1997-2009)    
15 Central African 
Republic 
Africa (1984-1988, 1994-1995)  (1998-2002, 2006-2010) (1987-1990)   
16 Chile South 
America 
(1983-1985, 1989-1990) (1985-1989)     
                                                 
14
 Source: IMF (2013i). To avoid writing 86 references for the data on disbursements for individual countries we refer to IMF (2013i) and encourage you to select the country 
of interest. 
15
 Some countries do not belong to any region, which means that the dummy for these countries is always zero. This is due to our choice of regions; Asia, Africa and South 
America, which do not include all the countries given loans during our chosen time period. 
  
 
17 China Asia (1986-1987)      
18 Colombia South 
America 
(2003-2006) (1999-2002)    (2009-
2010) 
19 Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Africa (1983-1990)  (2002-2006, 2009-2010) (1987-1990)   
20 Congo Africa (1986-1988, 1990-1992, 
1994-1995) 
 (1996-1999, 2004-2010)    
21 Costa Rica Central 
America 
(1985-1997, 2009-2010)      
22 Cote d'Ivoire Africa (1984-1992)  (1994-2005, 2009-2010)    
23 Cuba        
24 Dominican 
Republic 
 (1985-1986, 1991-1994, 
2003-2010) 
(1983-1985)     
25 Ecuador South 
America 
(1983-1992, 1994-1995, 
2000-2001, 2003-2004) 
     
26 Egypt Africa (1987-1988, 1991-1993, 
1996-1998) 
(1993-1996)     
27 El Salvador Central 
America 
(1990-2000, 2009-2010)      
28 Fiji        
29 Gabon Africa (1986-1995, 2000-2002, 
2004-2005, 2007-2010) 
(1995-1999)     
30 Gambia Africa (1984-1987)  (1988-1991, 1998-2005, 
2007-2010) 
(1986-1988)   
31 Ghana Africa (1983-1987) (1987-1988) (1988-1992, 1995-2006, 
2009-2010) 
(1987-1988)   
32 Guatemala Central 
America 
(1983-1984, 1988-1990, 
1992-1994, 2002-2004, 
2009-2010) 
     
33 Guyana South 
America 
(1986-1988)  (1991-2004, 2007-2010) (1987-1990)   
34 Haiti  (1983-1985, 1989-1990, 
1995-1996) 
 (1996-1999, 2006-2010) (1986-1989)   
35 Honduras Central 
America 
(1990-1992, 2008-2009)  (1992-1997, 1999-2002, 
2004-2007) 
   
  
 
36 India Asia (1991-1993) (1983-1984)     
37 Indonesia Asia (1997-1998) (1998-2003)     
38 Iran Asia       
39 Iraq Asia (2005-2010)      
40 Jamaica  (1984-1992, 2010) (1992-1996)     
41 Jordan Asia (1989-1994, 2002-2004) (1994-2002)     
42 Kenya Africa (1983-1986, 1988-1989)  (1989-1994, 1996-2007) (1988-1989)   
43 Lao People's  
Democratic 
Republic 
Asia   (1993-1997, 2001-2005) (1989-1992)   
44 Lesotho Africa (1994-1997)  (1991-1994, 2001-2004, 
2010) 
(1988-1991)   
45 Libya Africa       
46 Malawi Africa (1988-1989, 1994-1995) (1983-1986) (1988-1994, 1995-2008, 
2010) 
 (2008-
2009) 
 
47 Malaysia Asia       
48 Maldives Asia (2009-2010)    (2009-
2010) 
 
49 Mali Africa (1983-1990)  (1992-2010) (1988-1991)   
50 Mauritania Africa (1985-1988)  (1989-2004, 2006-2010) (1986-1989)   
51 Mauritius Africa (1983-1986)      
52 Mexico  (1986-1988, 1995-1997, 
1999-2000) 
(1983-1985, 1989-1993)    (2009-
2010) 
53 Mongolia Asia (1991-1992, 2009-2010)  (1993-2005)    
54 Morocco Africa (1983-1993)      
55 Mozambique Africa   (1990-2007) (1987-1990) (2009-
2010) 
 
56 Namibia Africa       
57 Nepal Asia (1985-1987)  (1992-1995,2003-2007) (1987-1990)   
58 Nicaragua Central 
America 
(1991-1993)  (1994-2010)    
59 Niger Africa (1983-1987, 1994-1995)  (1988-1991, 1996-2010) (1986-1988)   
  
 
60 Pakistan Asia (1988-1990, 1993-1997, 
2000-2001, 2008-2010) 
(1994-1995, 1997-2000) (1994-1995, 1997-2004) (1988-1991)   
61 Panama Central 
America 
(1983-1987, 1992-1997, 
2000-2002) 
(1997-2000)     
62 Papua New 
Guinea 
 (1990-1992, 1995-1997, 
2000-2001) 
     
63 Paraguay South 
America 
(2003-2008)      
64 Peru South 
America 
(1984-1985, 2001-2009) (1993-2001)     
65 Philippines Asia (1984-1988,1991-1993, 
1998-2000) 
(1989-1991, 1994-1998)     
66 Romania  (1991-2006, 2009-2010)      
67 Rwanda Africa   (1998-2009) (1991-1994)   
68 Senegal Africa (1983-1988, 1994)  (1988-1992, 1994-2006) (1986-1988) (2008-
2010) 
 
69 Sierra Leone Africa (1984-1987)  (1994-1998, 2001-2010) (1986-1989, 1994-
1995) 
  
70 South Africa Africa       
71 Sri Lanka Asia (1983-1984, 2001-2002, 
2009-2010) 
(2003-2006) (1991-1995, 2003-2006) (1988-1991)   
72 Sudan Africa (1984-1985)      
73 Swaziland Africa       
74 Syrian Arab 
Pepublic 
Asia       
75 United Republic 
Of Tanzania 
Africa (1986-1988)  (1991-1994, 1996-2007) (1987-1990)   
76 Thailand Asia (1985-1986, 1997-2000)      
77 Togo Africa (1984-1989)  (1989-1998, 2008-2010) (1988-1989)   
78 Tonga        
79 Tunisia Africa (1986-1988) (1988-1992)     
80 Turkey  (1984-1985, 1994-1996, 
1999-2008) 
     
81 Uganda Africa (1983-1984)  (1989-2006) (1987-1989)   
  
 
82 Uruguay South 
America 
1983-1987, 1990-1993, 
1996-2006) 
     
83 Venezuela South 
America 
(1996-1997) (1989-1993)     
84 Vietnam Asia (1993-1994)  (1994-1997, 2001-2004)    
85 Zambia Africa (1984-1987)  (1995-2010) (1995-1996)   
86 Zimbabwe Africa (1983-1984, 1998-2000) 
 
(1992-1995) (1992-1995)    
 Total number of 
loan programs: 
 69 
 
25 39 27 4 2 
 Percentage of 
total number of 
loan programs:  
 80,23% 29,10% 45,35% 31,40% 4,65% 2,33% 
 
 
 
  
      
Appendix B – Tests   
Table 7 – Results for test for non-stationary data
 
GDP   K   Edu   Fert   Open   Life   
Individual intercept     
  
    
  
    
  
Method Statistic 
Prob.*
* Statistic 
Prob.*
* Statistic 
Prob.*
* Statistic 
Prob.*
* Statistic 
Prob.*
* Statistic 
Prob.*
* 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root 
process)  
            Levin, Lin & Chu t* 91,162 1,000 337,541 1,000 416,757 1,000 438,077 1,000 21,352 1,000 264,373 1,000 
             Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
            Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -36,858 0,000 -5,329 0,000 -4,026 0,000 1,858 0,968 -39,456 0,000 -7,145 0,000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 1484,940 0,000 278,519 0,000 251,190 0,000 251,370 0,000 1631,700 0,000 412,027 0,000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 2101,510 0,000 1919,400 0,000 1777,750 0,000 1858,200 0,000 2528,840 0,000 1846,630 0,000 
             Individual intercept and time trend 
            Method 
            Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root 
process)  
            Levin, Lin & Chu t* 112,791 1,000 565,855 1,000 927,313 1,000 921,371 1,000 32,381 1,000 630,656 1,000 
Breitung t-stat -19,657 0,000 -7,624 0,000 -10,541 0,000 8,002 1,000 -14,126 0,000 9,559 1,000 
             Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
            Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -34,192 0,000 -2,567 0,005 -0,176 0,430 10,580 1,000 -36,454 0,000 8,284 1,000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 1432,060 0,000 227,252 0,003 152,554 0,854 121,446 0,999 1421,970 0,000 693,010 0,000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 
16909,70
0 0,000 
19091,60
0 0,000 
20089,90
0 0,000 
19042,00
0 0,000 
11440,70
0 0,000 
18774,70
0 0,000 
      
Non-stationary data can create a false correlation, as variables growth with time. By using 
unit root tests a non-time dependent correlation between the variables can be detected and 
the null-hypothesis (contains a unit root process) can be rejected (Brooks 2008, p. 327). 
The results of the tests are shown in Table 7, where the upper part of the table shows the 
results when the test are allowing for an individual intercept, while the lower part shows 
the results when the tests are allows for both an individual intercept and a time trend.  
The LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu) test assumes a common unit root process, and is more 
restrictive than the other tests performed. This test assumes an alternative hypothesis 
saying that all the series must be stationary to be able to reject the null-hypothesis, 
compared to the other tests where only one series need to be stationary (Harris & Sollis 
2003, p. 191-193). Evaluating the results of this test using the p-values, the null-hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for any of the variables. Due to the restrictive characteristics of this test 
the results are complemented with other tests.  
The other three tests have a null-hypothesis assuming individual unit-root process. 
The IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) test rejects the null-hypothesis for all the variables, except 
fertility rate. The ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) and PP (Phillips-Perron) tests reject the 
null hypothesis for all the variables at the one percentage level (Harris & Sollis 2003, p. 
196, Brooks 2008, p. 330-331).  
When the tests are allowing for individual intercepts and time trends, the LLC test 
again shows the same results and is not able to reject the null-hypothesis for any of the 
variables. Using the UB (Breitung) test a common unit root process is assumed and the 
null-hypothesis is rejected for all the variables, except for fertility rate and life expectancy. 
The IPS test rejects the null-hypothesis for GDP per capita, the stock of capital and 
openness, but not for education, fertility rate and life expectancy. The ADF test rejects all 
the null-hypothesis for all the variables, except education and fertility rate. Finally, the PP 
test rejects the null hypothesis for all the variables.  
In summary, the results three of the variables; GDP per capita, the capital stock and 
openness, are concluded to be stationary according to all tests, except for the LLC and UB 
tests. The deviating results of the UB test can be explained by the fact that this test only 
involves a constant (i.e. no fixed effects) (Harris & Sollis 2003, p. 195). While the 
restrictive character of the LLC test and its consistent inability to reject the null-hypothesis 
for any of the variables yields implausible results. For the other variables; the fertility rate 
and education, the tests yield inconclusive results. This can be due to the different 
assumptions of the tests. Both of the PP tests reject the null-hypothesis for all the variables, 
  
 
while the ADF and IPS test results are not as straight forward. The IPS is a generalisation 
if the LLC test, due to the relaxed alternative null hypothesis of the test (Harris & Sollis 
2003, p. 196). However, the IPS test also suffers from the same problems as the LLC test, 
the loss of power from using fixed effects, which can lead to under-rejection of the null 
hypothesis when it is false (Harris & Sollis 2003, p. 196). The ADF test is similar to the PP 
test, but it does not incorporate an automatic correction that allows for autocorrelated 
residuals (Brooks 2008, p. 330-331). 
 
Table 8 – Results for test of heteroskedasticity 
White's test for heteroskedasticity   
  
 Null-hypothesis: homoscedasticity 
   
 Chi-statistic 435.56 
Critical value 18.31 
 
Heteroskedasticity is a common issue in cross-sectional models. It occurs when the 
variance of the error terms vary across the sample. In order words the error term changes 
with explanatory variables (Hill et al. 2008, p. 198-199). To investigate the error terms a 
White’s test is performed, and the results of the test are shown in Table 8. The test is 
evaluated by calculating the chi-statistic: R-squared*number of observations. The null-
hypothesis (homoscedasticity) is rejected if the calculated chi-statistic is greater than the 
critical value, using ten degrees of freedom at the five-percentage level of significance. 
Heteroskedasticity was detected and resolved by using White’s standard errors (diagonal).  
After logging and differentiating the variables all equations were ran, with White’s 
robust standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity. To examine if the residuals suffer 
from autocorrelation an evaluation of the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistics is made using 
the Durbin-Watson test. The results are shown in Table 9. The null-hypothesis can only be 
rejected if the D-W value is lower than the lower critical value. It is not rejected if the D-W 
value is greater than the upper critical D-W value (Doughty 2011, p. 436-437). The critical 
value is obtained with six parameters and 100 observations at the five percentage level of 
significance. None of the D-W statistics reject the null-hypothesis. However, there is 
always a risk that some autocorrelation is left which has to be taken into account in the 
analysis of the results. 
 
  
 
Table 9 – Results for test of autocorrelation 
Durbin-Watson's test for autocorrelation   
Null-hypothesis: no autocorrelation       
         
         
 Model 1 OLS 2SLS D-W lower D-W upper 
Equation 1 1.92 1.92 1.57 1.78 
Equation 2 1.93 1.93 1.57 1.78 
Equation 3 1.95 1.95 1.57 1.78 
        
 Model 2       
 Equation 1 1.92 1.92 1.57 1.78 
Equation 2 1.93 1.93 1.57 1.78 
Equation 3 1.96 1.96 1.57 1.78 
        
 Model 3       
 Equation 1 1.92 1.92 1.57 1.78 
Equation 2 1.93 1.93 1.57 1.78 
        
 Model 4       
 Equation 1 1.92 1.92 1.57 1.78 
Equation 2 1.93 1.92 1.57 1.78 
Equation 3 1.95 1.95 1.57 1.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Appendix C – Description of variables  
 
Variable Source Description 
 
GDP 
 
Penn World 
Table (2012) 
 
Name of series: “PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), derived from 
growth rates of c, g, i, at 2005 constant prices”.  The variable is logged and 
differentiated.  
   
K Penn World 
Table (2012), 
Hall & Jones 
(1999) 
To calculate the stock of capital data on investments is used (Series: 
“Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant 
prices [rgdpl]”). Two formulas are applied:  
    = 
  
        
 and   = ((1-0.05)*    ) +    where d is the depreciation of 
capital which is set at 5% and    is the average growth rate of investments 
during 1970-1980. 
The variable is logged and differentiated. For Central African Republic, 
Nicaragua and Papua New Guinea the average growth of investments 
during 1970-1980 was negative and we therefore got a negative value of the 
capital stock. The growth rate was therefore corrected to 0. 
Edu Barro & Lee 
(2013) 
Name of series: “Avg. Years of Total Schooling (15 years of age and 
above)”. The variable was logged and differentiated. The variable was 
interpolated, from five-year based observations to yearly basis. 
  
 
Fert The World 
Bank (2013b) 
Name of series: “Fertility rate, total (births per woman)”. The variable is 
logged and differentiated. 
   
Open Penn World 
Table (2012) 
Name of series: “Openness at 2005 constant prices (%)”. The variable was 
only differentiated, since it was already a percentage share. 
   
Life The World 
Bank (2013c) 
 
Name of series: “Life expectancy at birth, total (years)”. The variable is 
logged and differentiated. 
IMF Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
IMF80
16
 Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
IMF90 Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
                                                 
16
 Even though representing the 1980 decade, this dummy only include observations from 1983-1989 because 
of the insufficient data on loan disbursement.  
  
 
0 otherwise. 
IMF00 Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
SBA Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
EFF Se appendix1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
ECF Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
SAF Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
ESF Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
FCL Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
Africa Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
Asia Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
South 
America 
Se appendix 1 The dummy takes the value of 1 for every year received a disbursement and 
0 otherwise. 
      
Appendix D – Descriptive data 
 
 
GDP GDPgr K Edu Fert Open Life 
Mean 3409,90 0,00 447,49 5,04 4,70 65,99 60,26 
Median 2511,98 0,02 364,60 4,90 4,83 57,64 60,83 
Maximum 19372,44 2,03 8849,91 11,07 8,29 351,94 79,19 
Minimum 160,80 -3,55 20,18 0,21 1,09 3,78 26,82 
Std. Dev. 2871,84 0,24 513,77 2,43 1,74 41,25 10,26 
Observations 3526 3525 3526 3526 3526 3526 3526 
      
Appendix E – The regression results  
 
Model  1 1 2 3 Model 2 1 2 3 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
K 0.265** 0.263** 0.265** 0.263** 0.265** 0.263** K 0.264** 0.271**  0.264** 0.271**  0.264** 0.271**  
s.e. (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) s.e. (0.125) (0.126)  (0.125) (0.126)  (0.125) (0.126)  
K(-1)   0.059 0.058 0.059 0.058 K(-1) 
 
  0.066 0.082  0.066 0.082  
s.e.   (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) s.e.      (0.082) (0.082)   (0.082) (0.082)  
K(-2)     -0.014 -0.014 K(-2)         0.000  -0.005  
s.e.     (0.086) (0.086) s.e.         (0.087)  (0.088)  
Edu 0.082 0.047 0.082 0.047 0.082 0.047 Edu 0.081 0.047  0.081 0.047  0.081 0.047  
s.e. (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) s.e. (0.108) (0.109)  (0.108) (0.109)  (0.108) (0.109)  
Edu(-1)   -0.040 -0.055 -0.040 -0.055 Edu(-1)      -0.042 -0.073   -0.042 -0.073  
s.e.   (0.114) (0.1115) (0.114) (0.1115) s.e.      (0.114) (0.117)   (0.114) (0.117)  
Edu(-2)     -0.067 -0.070 Edu(-2)         -0.076  -0.084  
s.e.     (0.114) (0.114) s.e.         (0.115)  (0.116)  
Fert 0.213** 0.231** 0.213** 0.231** 0.213** 0.231** Fert 0.218** 0.237**  0.218** 0.237**  0.218** 0.237**  
s.e. (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) s.e. (0.093) (0.094)  (0.093) (0.094)  (0.093) (0.094)  
Fert(-1)   0.201** 0.208** 0.201** 0.208** Fert(-1)      0.206** 0.227**   0.206** 0.227**  
s.e.   (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.094) s.e.      (0.095) (0.096)   (0.095) (0.096)  
Fert(-2)     0.109 0.110 Fert(-2)         0.120  0.131  
s.e.     (0.086) (0.086) s.e.         (0.087)  (0.088)  
Open -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 Open -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  
s.e. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) s.e. (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
Open(-1)      0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** Open(-1)      0.001** 0.001**   0.001** 0.001**  
s.e.      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) s.e.      (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  
Open(-2)          0.000  0.000 Open(-2)         0.000  0.000  
s.e.          (0.000)  (0.000) s.e.         (0.000)  (0.000)  
  
 
Life 0.025  0.012 0.025  0.012 0.025  0.012 Life 0.013 0.008  0.013 0.008  0.013 0.008  
s.e. (0.322)  (0.322) (0.322)  (0.322) (0.322)  (0.322) s.e. (0.325) (0.327)  (0.325) (0.327)  (0.325) (0.327)  
Life(-1)      0.242  0.236  0.242  0.236 Life(-1)      0.242 0.244   0.242 0.244  
s.e.      (0.253)  (0.254)  (0.253)  (0.254) s.e.      (0.254) (0.255)   (0.254) (0.255)  
Life(-2)          0.391  0.389 Life(-2)         0.394  0.365  
s.e.          (0.347)  (0.348) s.e.         (0.344)  (0.342)  
IMF 0.008***  0.019*** 0.008***  0.019*** 0.008***  0.019*** IMF80 0.005 0.021**  0.005 0.021**  0.005 0.021**  
s.e. (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) s.e. (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  
IMF(-1)     0.012***   0.018*** 0.012***  0.018***  IMF80(-1)     0.015***  0.036***  0.015***  0.036***  
s.e.     (0.003)   (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004)  s.e.     (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.010)  
IMF(-2)         0.012***  0.013***  IMF80(-2)         0.022***  0.019*  
s.e.         (0.003)  (0.005)  s.e.         (0.006)  (0.010)  
Constant 0.012***  0.008* 0.011***  0.009** 0.010*** 0.010***  IMF90 0.006 0.016  0.006 0.016  0.006 0.016  
s.e. (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  s.e. (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010)  
              IMF90(-1)     0.008  0.000  0.008  0.000  
              s.e.     (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  
              IMF90(-2)         0.002  -0.005  
              s.e.         (0.005)  (0.009)  
              IMF00 0.011*** 0.020***  0.011*** 0.020***  0.011*** 0.020***  
              s.e. (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  
              IMF00(-1)     0.013***  0.022***  0.013***  0.022***  
             s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
             IMF00(-2)         0.015***  0.027***  
             s.e.         (0.004)  (0.006)  
       
Constant 0.012*** 0.008*  0.012*** 0.012***  0.011*** 0.012***  
 
      
s.e. (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  
Observations 
2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 
Observatio
ns 2408 2408  2408 2408 2408 2408 
R-squared 0.133 0.129 0.135 0.134 0.127 0.127 R-squared  0.133 0.129  0.135 0.128 0.130 0.128 
  
 
Number of 
countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Number of 
countries  86   86 86 86 86 
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
Model 3 1 2  Model 4 1 2 3 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
K 0.240* 0.262**  0.240* 0.262**   K 0.257** 0.258**  0.257** 0.258**  0.257** 0.258**  
s.e. (0.124) (0.127)  (0.124) (0.127)   s.e. (0.125) (0.126)  (0.125) (0.126)  (0.125) (0.126)  
K(-1)     0.058  0.064   K(-1)     0.056  -0.057  0.056  -0.057  
s.e.     (0.083)  (0.085)   s.e.     (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.082)  
K(-2)          K(-2)         -0.015  -0.013  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.086)  (0.087)  
Edu 0.110 0.076  0.110 0.076   Edu 0.083 0.057  0.083 0.057  0.083 0.057  
s.e.  (0.106) (0.108)   (0.106) (0.108)   s.e. (0.107) (0.107)  (0.107) (0.107)  (0.107) (0.107)  
Edu(-1)     -0.028  -0.028   Edu(-1)     -0.036  -0.047  -0.036  -0.047  
s.e.     (0.114)  (0.144)   s.e.     (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.114)  
Edu(-2)          Edu(-2)         -0.065  -0.066  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.114)  (0.114)  
Fert  0.221** 0.226**   0.221** 0.226**   Fert 0.211** 0.212**  0.211** 0.212**  0.211** 0.212**  
s.e.  (0.095) (0.097)   (0.095) (0.097)   s.e. (0.092) (0.094)  (0.092) (0.094)  (0.092) (0.094)  
Fert(-1)     0.201**  0.220**   Fert(-1)     0.187*  0.192**  0.187*  0.192**  
s.e.     (0.098)  (0.100)   s.e.     (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.097)  
Fert(-2)          Fert(-2)         0.010  0.102  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.088)  (0.088)  
Open  -0.001 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001   Open -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  
s.e.  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)   s.e. (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
Open(-1)     0.001**  0.001**   Open(-1)     0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  0.001**  
s.e.     (0.000)  (0.000)   s.e.     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
  
 
Open(-2)          Open(-2)         0.000  0.000  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.000)  (0.000)  
Life  -0.016 0.010   -0.016 0.010   Life 0.018 0.019  0.018 0.019  0.018 0.019  
s.e.  (0.333) (0.340)   (0.333) (0.340)   s.e. (0.323) (0.320)  (0.323) (0.320)  (0.323) (0.320)  
Life(-1)     0.240  0.215   Life(-1)     0.248  0.251  0.248  0.251  
s.e.     (0.255)  (0.262)   s.e.     (0.253)  (0.253)  (0.253)  (0.253)  
Life(-2)          Life(-2)         0.401  0.404  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.345)  (0.345)  
SBA  -0.000 0.013**   -0.000 0.013**   Africa 0.016*** 0.014  0.016*** 0.014  0.016*** 0.014  
s.e.  (0.003) (0.005)   (0.003) (0.005)   s.e. (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009)  
SBA(-1)     0.009**  0.019***   Africa(-1)     0.007  0.006  0.007  0.006  
s.e.     (0.003)  (0.006)   s.e.     (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.009)  
SBA(-2)          Africa(-2)         0.004  0.000  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.005)  (0.009)  
EFF  0.002 0.010   0.002 0.010   Asia -0.005 0.005  -0.005 0.005  -0.005 0.005  
s.e.  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006)   s.e. (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  
EFF(-1)     0.004  0.001   Asia(-1)     0.005  0.017**  0.005  0.017**  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.012)   s.e.     (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  
EFF(-2)          Asia(-2)         0.013**  0.019***  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.005)  (0.007)  
ECF  0.016*** 0.016**   0.016*** 0.016**   South America 0.005 0.023***  0.005 0.023***  0.005 0.023***  
s.e.  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.006)   s.e. (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  
ECF(-1)     0.011**  0.013**   South America(-1)     0.016***  0.023***  0.016***  0.023***  
s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)   s.e.     (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
ECF(-2)          South America(-2)         0.016***  0.018***  
s.e.          s.e.         (0.004)  (0.006)  
SAF  0.003 0.009   0.003 0.009   Constant 0.011*** 0.009**  0.012*** 0.011***  0.012*** 0.018***  
s.e.  (0.012) (0.020)   (0.012) (0.020)   s.e. (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004)  
SAF(-1)     0.004  -0.005                
  
 
s.e.     (0.014)  (0.021)                
SAF(-2)                       
s.e.          
       ESF  -0.010 -0.013   -0.010 -0.013   
       s.e.  (0.020) (0.036)   (0.020) (0.036)   
       ESF(-1)     -0.008  0.003   
       s.e.     (0.024)  (0.061)   
       ESF(-2)          
       s.e.          
       FCL  -0.012 0.019*   -0.012 0.019*   
       s.e.  (0.020) (0.011)   (0.020) (0.011)   
       FCL(-1)     0.004  -0.745   
       s.e.     (0.015)  (2.205)   
       FCL(-2)          
       s.e.          
       Constant  0.012*** 0.009**   0.012*** 0.009**   
       s.e.  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   
       Observations  2408 2408  2408 2408   Observations 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 
R-squared  0.135 0.130  0.134 0.039   R-squared 0.134 0.130 0.134 0.132 0.126 0.126 
Number of countries  86   86  86   Number of countries 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Significance levels: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are reported 
 
  
 
Appendix F – Specified regression models 
 
The general model tested is: 
 
   (           (          (            (           (             (       
      (            
 
              
 
where     represents GDP per capita growth in country i at period t.       represents the groups 
of dummy variables tested in each of the four models. 
 
The specific models tested are: 
 Model 1:    (           (        (           
 
where      is a vector containing all the control variables and       is the dummy variable 
representing the overall effect of IMF participation on growth. 
 
Model 2:    (           (        (          (          (             
 
where       ,        and        are dummy varaibles representing each decade. 
 
Model 3:    (           (        (         (         (         (       
  (         (            
 
where      ,      ,      ,      ,       and       are dummy variables representing each 
lending arrangement. 
 
Model 4:    (           (        (            (          (                      
 
where         ,        and                are dummy variables representing each region. 
